The fundamental updating process in the tmnsfemble belief model is related to Lhe concept of specialization and can be described by a specialization matrix. The degree of belief in the truth of a proposition is a degree of justified support. The Principle of Minimal Commitment implies that one should never give more support to the truth of a proposition than justified. We show that Dempster's rule of conditioning corresponds essentially to the least commitled specialization, and that Dempster's rule of combination results essentially from commutativity requirements. The concept of generalization, dual to the concept of specialization, is described.
INTRODUCTION.
The dynamic of belief in the Dcmpster-Shafer theory is achieved by the application of Dempster's rule of conditioning and Dempster's rule of combination. Their appropriateness has been questioned (Levi 1983 , Kyburg 1987 , Pearl 1990 , Voorbracht 1991 . But most criticisms result from the fact that the Dcmpstcr-Shafcr theory is understood as a special form of upper and lower probability theory.
In response to these criticisms, one of us (Smets 1988, 199Ib, Smets and Kenncs 1990) developed the transferable belief model (TBM), a model to quantify Your l belief.
The TBM is build without using any concept of probability, hence the criticisms against the use of Dempster's rules do not apply (Smcts, 1991 a). But l.here l ·vou' is the agent that entertains the bel icfs considered in this presentation.
Philippe Smets IRIDIA Universite Libre de Bruxelles Brussels-Belgium is still the question of explaining why they should be used. This paper presents such a justification.
We present the needed material about the TBM in section 2. In section 3, we introduce the Principle of Minim al Com m itm ent. It consists in never giving more support to the elements of the domain of our beliefs than justified. When necessary, it permits us to select the least informative belief function in a set of equally justified belief functions.
In section 4, we study the dynamic components of the TBM, and in particular the expansion process, i.e. the addition of a belief without retracting any old beliefs (Gardenfors 1988). In the TBM, this expansion process is modeled by specialization matrices, i.e. operators that reallocate the basic belief masses that quantify our beliefs. The justification of both Dempster's rules is presented in section 5. It proceeds as follows.
When conditioning on an event A, the updated beliefs should give a null plausibility to A as A becomes impossible. The specialization matrix that satisfies that requirement and that induces the minimal commitment updating leads to an updated belief identical to the one obtained by the application of Dempster's rules of conditioning.
It seems natural to require that com binations of pieces of evidence commute among them and with any conditioning. Dempster's rule of combination is the unique solution satisfying these commutativity requirements.
These results provide justifications for the use of Dempster's rules when beliefs must be expanded by new pieces of evidence.
THE TRANSFERABLE BELIEF MODEL.
The transferable belief model covers the same domain of application as the subjective probability model except that beliefs are quantified by belief functions, not by probability functions. Let Q be a finite set of elements, called the frame of discernment. At most one of the elements of n corresponds to the actual state of affair, but we do not know which one. We can only assess the degrees of belief that this particular element belongs to the various subsets of n.
In the transferable belief model, a uniLary amount of belief is postulated, and it is distributed over the subsets of n. The part of belief m(A) given to A, called a ba sic belief mass (bbm), quantifies the part of our belief that supports A and does not support any strict subset of A due to lack of information. The bbm m(A) for A� Q are non negative and I. m(A) = 1.
A�Q
The function m: 2 n -) [0, 1 ] is called a bas ic belief assignment (bba). Th e degree of belief bei(A) allocated to a subset A of n is the sum of the parts of beliefs m(X) given to subsets X of A that are not subsets of A (so 0 is not included):
The degree of plausibility pi(A) quantifies the maximum amount of belief that might support A:
The commonal ity function q:2n�[0,1) is defined as q(A) = I_ m(B) A�B Let n = {a, b, c). Suppose You know only that M y l belief function over Q is such that belM e ({a)) = .3 and beiM e ({b,c)) = .5, and You do not know the value I give to bclM e for the other subsets of n. Suppose You have no other information on Q and You are ready to adopt M y belief as Yours. How to build Your belief given these partial constraints. M any belief functions can satisfy them. If you adopt the principle that subsets of n should not get more suppon than justified, then Your belief on il will be such that my0 u ({a))=.3, my0 u ({b,c))=.5 and my0 u ({ a,b,c) )=. 2 . Among all belief functions compatible with the constraints given by known values of belM e • bely0 u is the one that gives the smallest degree of belief to every subsets of n. The principle evokes here is called the Principle of Minimal Commitment. It is really at the core of the TBM, where degrees of belief are degrees of 'justified' supports.
With un-normalized belief functions, the principle definition is essentially based on the plausibility function. Suppose two plausibility functions plJ and pl2 such
We say that pl2 is not more committed than plt (and less committed if there is at least one strict inequality). The same qualification is extended to their related bba and belief functions. Among all belief functions on Q, the least committed belief function is the vacuous belief function (i.e. its bbm m(Q)=l).
When expressed with belief functions, th e principle becomes:
The concept of 'least commitment' permit the construction of a partial order = on the set of belief functions (Yager 1986, Dubois and Prade 1986).
We write:
to denote that piJ is equal to pl2 or more committed than pl2. By analogy the following notations m 1 = m2 and belt = bel2 have the same meaning. It is easy to show that the effects of both Dempster's rules can be obtained by specialization matrices.
Let m: 2n--) [0,1] be a bba and L be the set of specialization matrices on n.
I) To obtain Dempster's rule of conditioning, let C<;;; ; Q and let Sc be the specialization matrix such that
Let me be the bba obtained after conditioning the bba m on C by Dempster's rule of conditioning. Then me "' m·S c. We call S c the C-conditioning specialization matrix. We define :E cond <;;; ; I. as the set of C-conditioning specializations where ccn. In particular , if m is such that m(C) = I (the bba that corresponds to a conditioning on C) , then Sc =S m , so Lcond<;;; ; :E D .
2) To obtain
We consider that the expansion procedure by the specialization is one of the fundamental ideas for the dynamic part of the transferable belief model. In that model, the bba m(X) given to x<;;; ; n corresponds to that part of our belief that supports X without supporting any strict subset of X and which can be transferred to subsets of X if further information justifies iL Therefore we can accept that every expansion is defined by a specialization matrix. We will show that :
I. When conditioning on ACQ, S A E :E cond is the specialization matrix that induces the least committed beliefs on n derivable by a specialization and such that the updated plausibility given to A is 0. The requirement pi( A )=0 after expansion translates the fact that all elements of n in A are impossible.
2 . :Eo is the largest family of specialization matrices that commute and that includes L cond · The commutativity translates the idea that the expansion by two pieces of evidence should lead to the same result whatever the order with which they are considered. It is classically required for any expansion opemtor (Gardenfors 1988).
DEMPSTER'S RULES IN THE VIEW OF SPECIALIZATIONS.
We first show that S A E :E cond is the specialization matrix that induces the least committed belief on Q derivable by a specialization and such that the updated plausibility given to A is 0. 
QED
Since Dempster's rule of conditioning is idempotent, so are the conditioning specialization matrices.
Lemma 1: The specializations matri c es Se I: c o n d arc idempotent.
We prove that Eo is the largest set of specialization matrices that commULe among themselves and that 
Since the Dempster rule of combination is associative and commutative, the Dcmpsteria n specialization matrices commute. 
ANOTHER CHARACTERIZATION OF DEMPSTER'S RULE OF COMBINATION.
To understand this theorem, consider that My EC induces the bba mo on n. I want to build a specialization matrix S ready to combine the impact of any new evidence distinct from EC, i.e. to specialize any new bba m on n.
Let Io be the set of the specialization matrices S such that the application of S on any m on Q would be at least as committed as mo. One of the elemcms of Eo is S mo · the Dempsterian specialization matrix generated by mo.
For any bba m on Q, the bba m·S mo is less commiucd than the other bba m·S that could be obtained by the usc of the other specialization matrices S of Eo. De mpster's rule of combination satisfies that form of minimal commitment. Let m be the bba with m(A)= 1.
m.S = m � A ) and therefore m�AJ '= mo implying Now let m be an arbitrary bba on n. Let pi' be the plausibility function corresponding to m·S.
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where pi" denotes the plausibility function corresponding to mo·So and the inequality results from (*).
QED

GENERALIZATION TO CONTRACTION OF BELIEFS AND DISJUNCTIVE COMBINATIONS.
The presentation centered around the expansion process. But it can be adapted in a direct way to the inverse process of contraction, i.e. the change in belief where a belief is eliminated from the evidential corpus E C. The specialization matrices encountered in the expansion processes are replaced by de-specialization matrices. The de-specialization matrices are the (matricial) inverse of the specialization matrices. In contrast with the specialization matrices, they should not be applied to any bba, but only to a subset of bba that depends on the de-specialization matrix. This constraint reflects the fact that one can not eliminate from EC an evidence that had not been previously added to EC.
Pieces of evidence are combined conjunctively in the expansion: the aim is to compute the belief function beiE and F induced by the conjunction 'E and F of two pieces of evidence E and F from the belief functions beiE and beiF induced by each piece of evidence. In the retraction, the process can be seen as a special form of conjunctive combination. Eliminating evidence E from the EC that contains only the two distinct pieces of evidence E and F consists in adding the information 'eliminate E'. It aims at computing belf from beiE and F and bel E (in practice an easy task when commonality functions are considered as \f A <:;;; Q qf(A) = QE and f(A) I q E (A)).
One can define the processes of disjunctive combination of evidence that is dual to the conjunctive combination. The typical example is illustrated by the case where Your initial EC o is vacuous, where You know bel E and belf, and you can add only 'E or F' to ECQ. You must established bel E or F from beiE and bei F . The disjunctive rule of combination has been defined and justified in Smets (199lc), the major result being that the product of bbm m E (A) and m F (B) is transferred to AuB in m E or F· and \fA <:Q bel E or f(A) = bel E (A) belf(A). (in that no subset of A receives a support that is not given to the whole A). Finally it can also be shown that the dual and the inverse relations are in one-to-one correspondence. To any de specialization matrix corresponds a generalization maJrix, and vice versa. So we do not have four processes, but only two. Which of each pair of equivalent npproachcs is more convenient depends on the context.
CONCLUSIONS.
We provide justifications for Dempster's rule of conditioning and Dempster's rule of combination based on the following assumptions:
I. the expansion of any evidential corpus EC by an evidence E induces an updating from a prior bba mo into a posterior bba m I such that m 1 is a specialization or mo.
if the evidence E says that all clements in A �narc
impossible, then the specialization m 1 should be such that pl I (A )=0, and the least committed spccializntion m 1 is the one ob tained by applying De mpster's rule of conditioning on mo.
3. the result of the expansion or Your EC by two pieces of evidence should be independent of the order with which the two pieces of evidence are taken in consideration.
Therefore commutativity is required for the specialization matrices that represent these expansions, including those describing the con dition i ng process. The only specialization matrices satisfying these commutativity requirements are such that the result of their app lication is the same as the one obtained by the application of Dempster 's rule of combination.
